April 15, 2001
 
Dear Congressperson,
 
On behalf of the Palestinian Negotiations Affairs Department, I write with respect to your recent letter to President Bush urging that the U.S.-Palestinian relationship be reassessed. We understand your concerns about the ongoing violence between Palestinians and Israelis and, given that Palestinian deaths vastly outnumber Israeli deaths, we share your urgent desire to bring it to an end. At the same time, however, several assertions and recommendations contained in your letter appear to be based on incomplete information or a lack of understanding of what is necessary to attain a sustainable resolution of the conflict. We are concerned that some of your suggestions to President Bush would exacerbate violence rather than diminish it. 
 
First, while it is true that Prime Minister Barak's proposals at Camp David went further than any previous Israeli offer, it is not the case that this offer represented an "opportunity to secure virtually everything [the Palestinians] had been seeking from Israel." In fact, in every significant area of dispute, Prime Minister Barak's offer fell far short of minimum requirements for a viable, independent Palestinian state. In particular, Prime Minister Barak's offer would have left Palestinian territory divided into at least three non-contiguous cantons, all completely surrounded by Israeli-controlled territory. Prime Minister Barak's offer would have made Palestine nothing more than Arab "Bantustans" perpetually at the mercy of Israeli economic and military closures. Clearly, this formula is not the basis for an independent Palestine, nor for the peaceful conclusion of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This solution could no more solve the Palestinian-Israeli problem than the creation of Bantustans could have solved the problems of South Africa.
 
Prime Minister Barak's Camp David offer also failed to address the right of return for Palestinian refugees. If this issue is not addressed, many Palestinian refugees will reject a final agreement and will work to undermine it. Again, such an outcome is not a formula for peace in the region. The refugee issue is not insurmountable, however. In the weeks following Camp David, Israeli and Palestinian negotiators engaged usefully on the issue of refugees. In the negotiations at Taba, for example, very workable solutions to this issue were discussed. 
 
The third critical area in any peace settlement is Jerusalem. Since the beginning of the Oslo process and continuing until now, the Palestinian view has been that Jerusalem should be an open, shared city accessible by people of all faiths. Israel's offer at Camp David, however, was to annex much of the Old City and parts of Arab East Jerusalem, leaving only isolated and unconnected Palestinian neighborhoods under partial Palestinian control. Again, the Israeli view of peace at Camp David was to create Arab ghettos completely surrounded by Israel. For these reasons and others, the proposals presented at Camp David were insufficient for a fair and lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians. 
 
These shortfalls, while demonstrating the inadequacies of Prime Minister Barak's offer, do not explain the latest outburst of violence. To fully understand the current violence, one has to understand the broader context of Camp David and its aftermath. In the ten years since the Madrid Conference, none of the Palestinian expectations has been fulfilled. Israel has consistently either delayed implementing its commitments, such as completing troop withdrawals on schedule, or failed to honor peace commitments altogether, such as doubling the number of settlers, now at 350,000, illegally residing on confiscated Palestinian property. Please note, Israeli settlements in occupied territory are recognized as illegal under the Geneva Convention and in U.N. Security Council Resolution 465. 
 
In addition, the daily lives of Palestinians had deteriorated over the course of negotiations: unemployment rose rapidly due to economic closures; restrictions on movement and property confiscations increased as a result of settlement and "by-pass" road expansion; Israeli troop withdrawals were not completed and over eighty percent of the West Bank remained under Israeli security control; and, the May 1999 deadline included in the Oslo agreement for conclusion of a Final Status Agreement and the creation of a free and independent Palestine has long since passed with no conclusion. 
 
Into this tinderbox of frustration, anger and despair, Barak's proposals were presented as an ultimatum -- a "take it or leave it" final offer. Ariel Sharon's subsequent visit to the Haram al-Sharif on September 28, 2000, with over 1,000 armed Israeli occupation troops, was seen by many Palestinians as a visible demonstration that we would never achieve the goals that brought us to the negotiation table at the outset. Palestinians had largely come to believe that Israel no longer intended to abide by its land-for-peace commitments and, therefore, lost confidence in the peace process itself.
 
Clearly, the overriding interest of all parties- Israel, the United States, and most of all the Palestinians - is to renew confidence in the peace process on both sides. In order to restore Palestinian faith in the peace process and create conditions for renewal of negotiations, Israel must halt the confiscation of Palestinian land and settlement activity. The recommendations in your letter to President Bush cause concern because they will further undermine Palestinian confidence in the peace process and complicate a return to negotiations. Both sides to this conflict require a third-party facilitator for talks to resume. Progress has never been made without such a facilitator and, historically, the United States has been the most effective third-party. Your recommendation that U.S.-Palestinian relations be reassessed, and the suggestion that U.S.-Palestinian contacts be reduced, if not eliminated, will not contribute to ending the violence and returning to negotiations.
 
We look forward to working with you and other American leaders to bring about an end to violence, and end to Israeli settlement activity, and a fair, negotiated final agreement. Addressing Palestinian needs for a viable and independent state, as well as continued U.S.-Palestinian dialogue and interaction, are vital to achieving this goal. 

Sincerely,

Yaser Abed Rabbo
Negotiations Affairs Department
Palestine Liberation Organization